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THE TRIAL, THE BENCH, THE NET, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT:
THE POSSIBILITIES OF REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Robert Magee*

A judicial election system presents the opportunity, indeed the civic obligation, for voters and the
community as a whole to become engaged in the legal
process. Judicial elections, if fair and open, could be
an essential forum for society to discuss and define the
attributes of judicial excellence and to find ways to
discern those qualities in the candidates. The organized bar, the legal academy, public advocacy groups, a
principled press, and all the other components of functioning democracy must engage in this process.
Even in flawed election systems there emerge
brave and honorable judges who exemplify the law's
ideals. But it is unfair to them and to the concept of
judicial independence if the State is indifferent to a selection process open to manipulation, criticism, and
serious abuse.
Rule of law is secured only by the principled
exercise of political will. If New York statutes for
nominating and electing judges do not produce both
the perception and the reality of a system committed
to the highest ideals of the law, they ought to be
changed and to be changed now.

Executive Editor, Albany Government Law Review. J.D. Candidate, Albany Law School
2009; B.A., State University of New York at Albany. The author would like to thank his
father, without whom this Comment and little else in his life would be possible.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 [2012], Art. 3

1004

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 25

- N.Y State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791,
803 (2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
In New York State Board of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S.
Ct. 791 (2008), New York's judicial nominatingprocess was upheld
against a constitutionalchallenge by a wronged would-be New York
Supreme Court candidate in Brooklyn. While ultimately sanctioning
the process, nothing in any of the Court's opinions could be construed as an endorsement of it. Concurring,Justice Kennedy issued
a resoundingrebuke to New York as to how it conductsjudicial elections. This Comment forgoes analysis or conclusions on this nominating process beyond those reached by the Supreme Court with the
understanding that the changes needed are obvious and in the hope
that the issues will soon be remedied. Instead, it lays the groundwork
for potential reform of New York's judicial elections with an eye towards increasingthe quality of New York's alreadyformidable bench
and maximizing voter participationandjudicialelections' status as a
democratic exercise.
This Comment begins with an examination of how New York
State conducts andfinances judicial elections with consideration of
New York's judicial elections laws and a case study of the elections
conducted in the Third JudicialDistrict in the Fall of 2007. It then
considers the outermost bounds of reform by examining controlling
Supreme Court and New York Court of Appeals precedent governing
judicial election conduct andfinance. Next it distills, through a consideration of fundamentaljudicial and democratic values and practice, New York's interests in judicial selection through election and
explains how they can be reorganizedaccordingto three overarching
interests: judicial consistency, judicial veneration, and democratic
efficiency. This Comment then compares these interests to how judicial elections occur on the ground in order to see how or if these interests are achieved. Finally,having establishedwhat is done now in
New York's judicial elections, what can be done, and what can be
done better, this Comment will proposefive points of reform: 1) the
establishment by the State of an open-forum website to facilitatejudicial election debate; 2) relaxation of speech restrictions on judicial
campaign committees; 3) a moderate decrease in the campaign contribution limit; 4) the establishment of a unified campaign fund to
which donors must contribute; and 5) the reworking of the Judicial
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss4/3
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QualificationCommittee's mission from one of endorsement to one of
voter education.
These reforms and the thought processes that produce them
are tethered throughout to the most fundamental conceptions ofjudicial administrationand democratic election. What remains is afairly
dramatic departurefrom existing judicial election norms that will
prove useful to lawmakers interested in reforming judicial elections
in the wake ofL6pez Torres.
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THE TRIAL, THE BENCH, THE NET, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT:
THE POSSIBILITIES OF REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

In 1992, Judge Margarita L6pez Torres, a former legal services attorney, became the first Latina elected to the civil court in
King's County.'

She did so with the nomination of Brooklyn's de-

mocratic party and with, by implication, the blessing of Democratic
county leader, Assemblyman Clarence Norman, Jr.2 In violation of
an apparent quid pro quo between party leaders and the party's nominees, L6pez Torres hired her own legal secretary, a friend from her
days as a legal services attorney, with twenty years experience instead of one of the party's designates.
Assemblyman Norman took note.

Three years later, L6pez

Torres again refused to hire on behalf of the party, when she declined
to take on another local Assemblyman's daughter as her court clerk.'
As Norman promised, the party did not forget.6 Each of the
three times the Brooklyn Democratic Party's judicial nomination
convention 7 met during her term as a civil court judge, L6pez Torres
1 Robin Finn, Blazing a Trail, and Following Her Own Sense of What's Right, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2008, at B2.
2 Tom Robbins, The Judge Who Said No, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 6, 2002, at 24.

3Id.
4 Id.

5 Id.
6

Id.

7 L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 179-80 (2d Cir. 2006); see
also Finn, supra note 1. In reality, the convention was a secret slate of delegates who rubber
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was denied even consideration for nomination to the county supreme
court.

At the 1997 convention L6pez Torres' name appeared on a

rogue slate proposed by a minority faction of Brooklyn Democrats
attempting to wrest local control from Assemblyman Norman. 9 This
sealed her status as an uncooperative "ingrate," and when party leaders convened again in 2002, they decided not to nominate L6pez Torres upon the expiration of her term, effectively ousting her from the
bench.10

In an action that required the Second Circuit to "peer inside
New York State's political clubhouses and determine whether party
leaders have arrogated to themselves a choice that belongs to the
people,"'" L6pez Torres challenged New York's judicial nomination
process on First Amendment grounds. 12 She claimed the State's
maintenance of a nomination process so prone to monopolization by
a small class of party bosses violated New Yorkers' rights to a "realistic opportunity to participate in a [political party's] nominating
process.' ' 13 Although the Second Circuit upheld an injunction against
the process, which the Eastern District of New York had seen fit to
grant pending legislative action, 14 all nine Justices of the Supreme
Court held that internal party politics could not create a constitutional

stamped a slate of delegates selected by Norman.
8 L6pez Torres, 462 F.3d at 179-80.
9 Robbins, supra note 2.
10

Id.

11 L6pez Torres, 462 F.3d at 169.
12 L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
13 L6pez Torres, 462 F.3d at 187; N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct.
791,797 (2008).
14 L6pez Torres, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 256.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss4/3
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issue unless they were the actual manifestation of a state's law. 5
Such domination, the Court reasoned, could very well be a manifestation of popular, democratic will, and it simply was not their place to
question

it. 16

In any event, Judge L6pez Torres had no cause to chal-

lenge the nominating process of New York's judicial elections.
Yet nothing about the L6pez Torres ruling can be construed as
an endorsement of how New York elects its judges. As L6pez Torres' story so clearly demonstrates, New York selects judges based not
on the candidate's integrity, impartiality, or intelligence, but on her
connections with local party bosses and her ability to complement
those bosses' power.' 7 The Court was correct in finding that while
this situation was not sanctioned by New York's election laws-it
was the laws that were at fault.18 The wrong perpetrated against
'5

L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. at 798.

16 Id. at 797, 798.
17

Judicial elections are generally unpopular among the legal community. See Republican

Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788, 789 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Joel
Stashenko, Spitzer Proposes Court Reform Plan, Merit Selection for Judges, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
24, 2007, at 1; Press Release, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, State Bar Endorses Governor Spitzer's
Merit
Selection
Plan
(June
21,
2007),
available
at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cftn?Section=Home&CONTENTID=8561 &TEMPLA
TE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm; Press Release, Am. Judicature Soc'y, AJS Receives Grant to
Promote Merit Selection (2008), available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/ajs-OSIgrant.asp;
Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, History, Mission, and
Goals, http://www.abanet.org/judind/home.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2009). In the wake of
L6pez Torres, it is likely many will attempt to throw the baby out with the bathwater. This
Comment abstains from this debate (except insofar as any discussion of reform is an argument for conservation) except to offer the following: New York's judicial electoral process
is more a system of political appointment than an election. It is the same element, local machine politics, which separates it from both. In wrestling judicial selection from these sorts
of politics, either the people or their representatives will have to fill the void. The problem
with choosing the representatives to do this is that the representatives are the same people
running the machines New York ought to rid itself of. Moreover, it is unlikely that New
Yorkers' votes in judicial elections will ever stray far from the endorsement of their representatives. Therefore, the same judges will be elected, but without the legitimacy of an open
electoral process or the independence judicial elections confer upon the judiciary as a branch
of government.
18 See L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. at 799.
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L6pez Torres was also perpetrated against the citizens of Kings
County and was the fault of legislative negligence, coupled with an
understanding among lawmakers that they ought not to intrude on
each other's turf.
As is clear, the party nomination process must be changed,
but that is not the subject of this Comment. The focus instead will be
on the elections that occur afterward. Pre-L6pez Torresjudicial elections were largely matters of ceremony. This Comment attempts to
suggest how New York's judicial elections might be prepared for a
post-L6pez Torres world where the endemic failures of the nominating process have been remedied.
Part I begins with an examination of how New York State
conducts and finances judicial elections. Part II then considers the
outermost bounds of reform by examining controlling Supreme Court
and New York Court of Appeals precedent governing judicial elections and campaign finance. Part III then distills, through a consideration of fundamental judicial and democratic values and practice,
New York's interests in judicial selection through election and discover they can be organized according to three overarching interests.
Part IV then compares these interests to how judicial elections occur
on the ground in order to see how or if these interests are achieved.
Finally, having established what is done in New York's judicial elections, what can be done, and what can be done better, this Comment
will propose five points of reform.
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THE How OF NEW YORK JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

A.

The Elected Judiciary

Of the 1,143 full-time judges in New York State, seventythree percent are elected. 19 Judges of the Court of Claims,2 ° Appel-

late Division, 2 1 and Court of Appeals 22 are appointed according to political nomination. Many of these judges are elected to serve a fourteen-year term in a division of the Supreme Court of one the State's
eleven judicial districts.2 3 The number of justices in each district is
determined by the legislature, so long as there is no more than one
justice for every 50,000 people. 24 The second-most visible class con-

sists of elected judges presiding over county courts who serve for ten
years. 25 Surrogate and Family Court judges are also elected to tenyear terms.26 New York's remaining elected judges preside over any

19 N.Y. STATE COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, FINAL

5 (2006), available at
http://law.fordham.edu/commission/judicialelections /main.html. The Commission to Promote Confidence in Judicial Elections was created by Chief Judge Kaye in April of 2003 and
is charged with making recommendations to increase confidence in the judicial electoral
process in New York. Id.
20 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (stating the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over
cases against the state); see also DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 14 (4th ed. 2005)
(1978).
21 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4(c) (stating that justices of the Appellate Division are "designated by the governor, from all the justices elected to the supreme court"). Thus, the argument could be made that New York's first-level appellate judges are elected, but the moment
of ascension only occurs at the moment of nomination.
22 N.Y. CONST. art VI, § 2(c)-(e).
23 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 6; COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

ELECTIONS, supra note 19, at 5-6. To clarify a likely semantic confusion, Judges of the Supreme Court bear the title of Justices. For the purposes of this Comment, the generic term
"judge" will be employed since town, city, etc. judges, are included in the analysis.
24 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 6(a), (b), (d).
25 N.Y. CONST. art VI, § 10(b).
26 N.Y. CONST. art VI, §§ 12(c), 13(a). The terms and means of selection for Surrogate
and Family Court judges are different for courts within New York City. Notably, the mayor
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number of town, village, and city courts. 2 7 Their duties, classification, and even existence are within the provenance of the legislature.
However, their means of appointment is set; they are to serve fouryear terms to which they are elected.
B.

8

The Conduct of the Elected Judiciary

The rules governing judicial conduct are to be found in Part
100 of the 22nd title of the New York Compilation of Codes, Rules
and Regulations.29 Part 100 governs both sitting and aspiring judges,
with special provisions set aside for the latter. By announcing her
candidacy for the bench or authorizing the acceptance of donations
pursuant to a campaign for it, a person subjects herself to the dictates
of Part 100.30
All candidates for public office in New York are subject to
laws prohibiting traditionally undesirable electoral activity.31 Judicial
candidates, as per Part 100, are further limited. As was deemed constitutional in L6pez Torres, a political party's nominating committee
selects candidates.

32

Once a person becomes a judicial candidate, she

is bound to "maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act
in a manner consistent with the impartiality, integrity and independ-

appoints Family Court judges.
27 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 17.
28 Id.

29 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 100.0-100.7 (2009).
30 Id. § 100.0(A) (setting grounds for when a party officially becomes a candidate for elec-

tion).
31 See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17 (McKinney 2007).
32 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-106 (McKinney 2007); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 800-01 (2008).
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This ambiguous admonition permeates the

entire life of a judicial candidate. She is bound to discourage employees, associates, and even family members from acting contrary to
it.34

Judicial candidates are foreclosed from making pledges or prom-

ises other than impartial discharge of their duties in office. 35 Nor are
they allowed to associate themselves with other candidates or political parties 36 or even to attend political gatherings except under controlled circumstances. 37 Even with regard to her campaign, a judicial
38
candidate is required to remain aloof.
A recent administrative enactment requires screening of judicial candidates by an Independent Judicial Election Qualification
Commission established in each of the State's twelve judicial districts. 39

The qualifications gauged include "professional ability;

character, independence and integrity; reputation for fairness and lack
of bias; and temperament, including courtesy and patience., 40 The
Commission's findings are made available as a means of informing
voters and earning their confidence. 41 This rule preempts (but may
herald) the Judiciary Qualifications Act, currently before the New
York State Assembly, which would make the designation of "well33

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.5(A)(4)(a) (2009).

34 Id. § 100.5(A)(4)(a)-(c).
31 Id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(i), (ii).
36 Id. § 100.5(A)(1).
31 Id. § 100.5(A)(1)(g).
38 Id. § 100.5(A)(2) (allowing a judicial candidate to speak on her own behalf, but not to
personally solicit contributions, to appear in newspapers supporting her candidacy, or to appear at gatherings unless all other candidates are present, and to permit the listing of her
name on election materials).
39 N.Y. RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE § 150.1 (2007), available at

http://www.nycourts.gov/rules/ chiefadmin/1 50.shtml?#A.
40 Id. § 150.5(b).
41 Id. § 150.0.
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qualified" by similar panels a requirement for ballot access.4 2
C.

The Financing of the Elected Judiciary

Though New York's contribution limits create different
schedules for different offices, judicial campaign contributions are
governed by the same catch-all limits imposed on "other public offices., 43 Contributions from family members are capped at $0.05 per
registered voter in the electoral district for a minimum limit of $1,250
and a maximum $100,000. 4 4 The same formula applies to non-family
members, except that such contribution limits must be more than
$1,000 and less than $50,000. 45 These limits apply to general, special, and primary elections, except that in the last case the formula is
calibrated to enrolled (as opposed to registered) voters. As such, an
individual might contribute $50,000 to a candidate during her nomination, another $50,000 during her election, and yet another $50,000
in the event of a special election thereafter.46
New York's judicial candidates are prohibited from soliciting
or accepting funds except through campaign committees composed of
42

See New York State Assembly, Comm. on Judiciary News, http://assembly.state.ny.us/

comm/Judiciary/20040817/ (discussing the Judicial Qualification Act which is currently before the New York State Assembly) (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). This bill was passed by the
Assembly in 2004, but the New York State Senate declined to enact it. The Act would "ensure that justices serving on the state Supreme Court ... are chosen from a pool of candidates who are well qualified, ethical and committed to the fair administration of justice." Id.
43 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-114(l)(b)(ii) (McKinney 2007); see also N.Y.S. BD. OF
ELECTIONS, HANDBOOK OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE 16-19
(2007),
available
at
http://www.elections.state.ny.us.NYSBOE/download/finance/hndbk2007.pdf.
44 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-114(l)(b)(ii) (McKinney 2007).
45 Id. Different rules and formulas apply to primaries and to funds expended in certain
ways, but, like campaign finance laws elsewhere, New York's are devastatingly complex
and immune from full treatment in a note or comment.
46 See id. § 14-114(1).
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"responsible persons" of the candidate's choosing, and then only in
the nine months leading up to the nomination convention may they
do so. 4 7 In the reverse, a judicial candidate is not permitted, except
through her committee, to "make any contribution" to other campaigns.4 8 If any candidate (judicial or otherwise) receives a contribution from an anonymous donor, it must be deposited via the state
comptroller into the state treasury. 49 Finally, an oft-employed exception allows a judicial candidate to purchase tickets to a political dinner or function so long as the cost of the ticket is proportionate to the
cost of the dinner or function and, if such a ticket exceeds $250, a
statement must be obtained from the dinner's sponsor that the cost is
proportionate to the actual services rendered.50
This system actually leaves judicial campaigns over-financed.
To take a recent example: in the fall of 2007, there were four candidates campaigning for three open Supreme Court seats in the Third
Judicial District,5' which encompasses seven upstate New York counties, including Albany County. 52 The candidates included three incumbents and one Surrogate Court Judge, Cathryn Doyle.53 Two of
the three incumbents received every one of the Republican, Democrat, Independent, and Conservative Party nominations, while the

47 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 §§ 100.0(Q), 100.5(A)(5) (2009).
48 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-162 (McKinney 2007).
41 Id. § 14-128.

N.Y. COMP. CODESR. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.5 (A)(2)(v) (2007).
51 Carol DeMare, PartiesPick Candidatesfor State Judgeships,ALB. TIMES UNION, Sept.
26, 2007, availableat http://timesunion.com/AspStories/storyprint.asp?StorylD=624940.
52 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 6(a).
53 DeMare, supra note 51. All were deemed "qualified" by the Independent Judicial
Campaign Commission. Press Release, Third Dep't Indep. Judicial Election Qualification
Commissions (Oct. 10, 2007) (on file with author).
50
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other received all but the Conservative nomination, which went to
Doyle, who was defeated.54
Joseph Teresi was one of the incumbents to receive nominations from all nominating parties.

55

Though his election was a fore-

gone conclusion by any standard, between November 2006 and his
election in November 2007, the Committee to Re-Elect Justice Joseph

C.

Teresi

$116,386.52.

57

received

$282,906.30

dollars.56

It spent

Similarly, the Committee to Elect Judge Christopher

Cahill received $56,948.008 over the same period and spent only
$24,981.65

59

while the Committee to Re-Elect George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Supreme Court Justice was rounding up $149,809.0060 in donations
and managed to spend only $79,602.0761 of them. Even the underdog, Friends of Judge Cathryn Doyle, spent only $12,610.6362 of the

54 New York State Bd. of Elections, 2007 Election Results, Third Judicial District,
http://www.elections.state.ny.us/2007electionresults.html (select "Third Judicial District")
(last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
55 DeMare, supra note 5 1.
56 New York State Bd. of Elections, Campaign Finance, Disclosure Reports, Committee to
Re-Elect Justice Joseph C. Teresi, http://www.elections.state.ny.us (select "Campaign Finance"; then follow "Disclosure Reports"; then select "View Contributions and Expenditures"; search for "Teresi"; finally choose "The Committee to Re-Elect Justice Joseph C.
Teresi"). The Board maintains an updated database of campaign contribution disclosures,
which is accessible through its website. The numbers used in this Comment for all candidates are based on a query from November 7, 2006 to November 7, 2007 (last visited Mar.
27, 2009).
57 Id.
58 New York State Bd. of Elections, Campaign Finance, Disclosure Reports, Committee to
Elect Judge Cahill, http://www.elections.state.ny.us (select "Campaign Finance"; then follow
"Disclosure Reports"; then select "View Contributions and Expenditures"; search for "Cahill"; finally choose "Committee to Elect Judge Cahill") (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
59 id.
60 New York State Bd. of Elections, Campaign Finance, Disclosure Reports, Committee to
Re-Elect George B. Ceresia, Jr., http://www.elections.state.ny.us (select "Campaign Finance"; then follow "Disclosure Reports"; then select "View Contributions and Expenditures"; finally search for "Ceresia") (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
61 Id.

62 New York State Bd. of Elections, Campaign Finance, Disclosure Reports, Friends of
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$32,690.6563 it raised.64 It is apparent that judicial candidates are
given more money than they need and the amount of money they

need is not great.
But what is this money actually spent on?

Justice Teresi

spent $5,188 of his war chest taking advantage of the event-tickets
exception. 65 This isfar less than the $15,098.62 spent on raising
funds,6 6 and nothing compared to the amount of money spent on the

one thing you would expect it to be spent on: making the public
aware of Justice Teresi's candidacy.

All things considered, the

Committee to Re-Elect Justice Joseph C. Teresi spent $79,220.56 on
"getting the word out."' 67 This included $38,894 on television ads,
$8,874.36 on campaign literature, and another $1,516.95 mailing the
materials.68

This $79,220.56 marks an intersection of the two interests

Judge Cathryn Doyle, http://www.elections.state.ny.us (select "Campaign Finance"; then
follow "Disclosure Reports"; then select "View Contributions and Expenditures"; search for
"Doyle"; finally choose "Friends of Judge Cathryn Doyle") (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
63 Id.

64 Although not entirely relevant, it is worthwhile to mention there is no statutory or case
law governing the fate of unspent campaign donations. However, advisory opinions of the
Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics require they be returned to donors. N.Y. Advisory
Comm.
on
Judicial
Ethics,
Op.
No.
93-80
(1993),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/judicialethics/opinions/93-80-.pdf, 28 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Courts
and Judges § 375 (2009). In discussions with local attorneys, as well as monitoring of local
news and professional publication, the author has found nothing to suggest the candidates
did otherwise.
65 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.5 (A)(2)(v); Committee to Re-Elect
Justice Joseph C. Teresi, supra note 56.
66 See Committee to Re-Elect Justice Joseph C. Teresi, supra note 56. This number accounts for the cost of designated fundraisers and invitations thereof and does not include a
$1,660 "campaign dinner" claimed on September 25, 2007, or a $410 campaign breakfast
one month later, or other, miscellaneous campaign breakfasts, dinners and lunches, none of
which exceeded $100.
67 Id.

68 Id. The remainder was spent on things like stationary, gasoline, and other incidental
expenses.
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governing electoral campaigns: the interest of the candidate in getting elected and the interest of the public in choosing the best candidate. 69 While these two overlap in their means-publication for the
candidate and education for the voter-their purposes are diametrically opposed unless the candidate spending and the best candidate in
a given election are the same person. In a contested election, this will
be the case, at best, only half of the time. As such, the lesser candidate's interest in getting elected and any money spent toward that end
and beyond its informative function will undermine the public's interest. Thus, the $79,220.56 spent by the Teresi campaign on promotion is an invaluable service to democracy as the public receives it,
but its dispensation is governed by the necessarily independent aspirations of the candidate, which may serve to undermine the public interest. This, that candidates for public office harbor independent ambition apart from the public good, is true of all elections and
highlighting it is not meant to be incendiary or indignant. This Comment's only concern is that laws forbidding the judicial candidate
from taking a direct or active role in her campaign 70 constitute a feeble obfuscation of this reality. Yet it remains as true in judicial elections as it does in any other contest, and in moving forward, it may be
better to face it outright.7"
69 There is another way to conceptualize these interests. The candidate's interest is the

primordial impetus for human government: the will to wield power. Processes of leadership
selection, democracy being one, are attempts to systematize this largely malevolent impulse
with an eye towards containing it. Thus, the second interest arises in response and to temper
the first, a manifestation of the understanding that leadership is desired, but not tyranny.
70 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.5(A)(2).
71 See infra text accompanying note 181. There is clearly a third interest at work; that of
the donor as gambler discussed infra note 188 or as genuine proponent. However, the donor's specific gambler interest has been largely served by the time the donation is spent and
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

A.

Conduct

Insofar as they significantly regulate political speech and the
relationship between a candidate and her family, it is apparent that
the laws governing the conduct of judicial elections in New York are
fraught with problematic First and Fourteenth Amendment implications.7

In spite of this and the finding that the speech of judicial

candidates was worthy of strict scrutiny by the United State Supreme
Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the New York
Court of Appeals roundly upheld section 100's activity and speech
restrictions against post- White challenges.73
1.

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

In White, the Supreme Court considered a Minnesota law (the
Announce Clause) that prohibited a judicial candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.74 The Court
ruled that judicial campaign speech was at the "core" of speech protected by the First Amendment, such that strict scrutiny was the
proper standard of review for laws governing it.7 5 With this estabthe proponent-remainder has melded with that of the candidate.
72 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506-19 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the family as an associational right protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment in concurring with the Court's overruling of a city ordinance defining family as
limited to parents and children).
73In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (N.Y. 2003); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1290-91
(N.Y. 2003).

74 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768.

See MINN. CODE OF

JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5 (A)(3)(d)(i) (2000).

71 White, 536 U.S. at 774-75 ("[R]espondents [Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards]
have the burden to prove that the announce clause is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a
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lished, Minnesota attempted to justify the Announce Clause as narrowly tailored to the state's interest in judicial impartiality.16 However, Minnesota neglected to propose a definition of "impartiality,"
so the Court considered three possible definitions-lack of party bias,
77
legal impartiality, and open-mindedness-and ruled on each in tum.
The Court agreed that lack of party bias was a compelling
state interest, but held Minnesota's Announce Clause was not narrowly tailored to achieve this interest because it prohibited any
speech on political issues, as opposed to speech favoring one party
over another.7 8 Next, it found that legal impartiality-a lack of predisposition toward questions of law-was, if not impossible, not traditionally required, and would require an uninformed bench. " As
such, it was not deemed a compelling state interest. 80 Finally, the
Court declined to rule on whether open-mindedness was a compelling
state interest, and concluded that even if it was the Announce Clause
failed to achieve it since it allowed partial speech before and after an
election, but not during. 8' The Court acknowledged the exigencies of
judicial office permitted greater speech restrictions on judicial candidates than would be allowed against legislative candidates,82 but went
on to de-emphasize the distinction between judicial and legislative

compelling state interest.").

Though both parties stipulated that strict scrutiny was the

proper standard of review, the Court agreed without reservation.
76 Id. at 775.

at 775-85.
71 Id. at 776.

71 Id.

79 Id. at 777-78.

0 White, 536 U.S. at 777-78.
81 Id. at 779-80.
82 Id. at 783.
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elections.83
2.

In re Raab/In re Watson

In two post-White per curiam opinions, the New York Court
of Appeals ruled that Part 100, New York's version of the Announce
Clause, which was examined above, was distinguishable from Minnesota's Announce Clause for two reasons. First, the Court of Appeals found Part 100 only prohibits campaign promises that run contrary to impartial performance of the office and allows candidates to
announce their views on legal and political issues. 84 In Raab, the
Court of Appeals addressed Part 100's activity restrictions and
stressed they were narrowly tailored in prohibiting judicial candidates
only from participating in other candidates' campaigns, while allowing them to participate in their own.8 5 As such, Part 100 was deemed
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest and survived strict
scrutiny. 86

83 Id. at 784.

Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 6.
85 Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1292-93.
86 In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2003); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (N.Y.
84

2003). The N.Y. Attorney General and the State Commission on Judicial Conduct named, in
amicus curia, the State's interest in impartiality as preventing actual or apparent party bias
and close-mindedness. Though not defined as such in the New York Code, the Court of Appeals accepted this as New York's genuine purpose in drafting the regulation and, as per
White, found it to be compelling. See Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 6. It is also worthwhile to note

the Court of Appeals elaborated on the impartiality interest by anchoring it to the due process right of litigants to a fair trial. Id.; Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1290.
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Finance
1.

Contribution Limits

In the financing of judicial elections, Buckley v. Valeo, 87 in
which the United States Supreme Court largely upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,88 is controlling. The Buckley Court upheld limits on campaign contributions,89
while finding limits on campaign expenditures (both by the candidate
and private individuals) unconstitutional.9"

The Court first made an

implicit finding that the First Amendment protects monetary political
expenditures, and limits on them invoked strict scrutiny. 91 In applying this analysis, the Court deemed "corruption and the appearance of
corruption" a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify otherwise impermissible speech regulation. 92

The Court's distinction

hinged on narrow tailoring; monetary political donation is a small
class of speech, and since the candidate spent donations, there was a
direct correlation between donations and the actual or apparent cor-

87 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

88 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-37). The Act imposed on federal campaigns contribution
limits, personal expenditure limits, and reporting requirements. It also established the Federal Election Commission.
89 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38.
90 Id. at 58-59.

91 Id. at 44-45. It should be noted that Buckley was the first time the Court equated money
with speech. See Stephanie A. Sprague, The Restriction of Political Associational Rights
Under Current CampaignFinanceReform First Amendment Jurisprudence,40 NEw ENG. L.

REv. 947, 983 (2006). Further, the Court did so without explanation or dissent until Justice
Stevens' concurrence in Shrink Missouri. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't. PAC, 528 U.S. 377,

398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Nixon, Justice Stevens argued that while certain
monetary expenditures were entitled to First Amendment protection, they ought not to be
afforded the same protection as political expression. Id. at 398-99.
92 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26.
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ruption of the candidate.93 The contribution limits upheld in Buckley
were $1,000 to any given candidate with an aggregate $25,000 limit
on political donations in any given year. 94 Without stating how low
these could go, the Court emphasized that contribution limits had to
be "closely drawn," as per strict scrutiny, to the prevention of actual
or apparent corruption. 95 In subsequent cases, the Court elaborated
on this by requiring that campaign contribution limits allow a party or
candidate to run an effective campaign, with a non-incumbent campaign as the barometer. 96 Some specificity emerged years later with
Randall v. Sorrell,9' in which the Court invalidated Vermont's contribution limits of between $200 and $400 (depending on the candi98
date) as too low to be closely drawn to the corruption interest.
Vermont also presented a new state interest: maximizing the time
elected officials spent doing their jobs instead of raising campaign
funds. 99 This was not a compelling state interest because the Court

reasoned it would be tantamount to overruling Buckley by justifying
expenditure limits. 00 With Randall, the Court unveiled a balancing
test for determining whether contribution limits were too low to be
narrowly tailored to the actual or apparent corruption interest.0 1 The

" Id. at 26-27.
94 Id. at 7.

9' Id. at 25.
96 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397.
9'

548 U.S. 230 (2006).

98 Id. at 261.
99 Id. at 245.

0 Id. at 244-46. Perhaps insecure due to the circuitousness of their logic, the Court cited
an amici brief submitted in Buckley to hold that the Court had in fact considered the candidate-time-conservation interest in rendering its ruling, even though it was not mentioned in
the Buckley Court's opinion.
10

See id. at 249-50.
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Court will consider the contribution limits of other states 1 2 along
with five other factors: 1) flexibility of a party to spend strategically;10 3 2) ability of contributors to entrust money is spent properly
in lieu of their ability to do so;104 3) right to incur expenses in the
course of volunteering;10 5 4) lack of inflation adjustment; and 5) gen0 6
eral low-ness absent special justification.
2.

Independent Expenditures

Buckley found that independent personal expenditure limits
implicate a fatally broad swath of protected speech, 0 7 and are not under the direction of the candidate such that they cannot give rise to
corruption or its appearance. 0 8 As such, independent expenditure
limits were unconstitutional.' 0 9 However, because the Court found
that express advocacy" 0 carried with it the danger of actual or implied corruption, Buckley subjected express advocacy limits to the
same analysis as was applied to contribution limits."' General issue
advocacy, on the other hand, was found to enjoy near impermeable
First Amendment protection, since it is not rationally related to actual

Randall, 548 U.S. at 250-51.
Id. at 253-54.
104 Id. at 256-58.
'05 Id. at 259-60.
106 Id. at 261.
102

103

107 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.

'o' Id. at 46.
109 Id. at 58.
"0 See id. at 43 ("[Clommunications that include explicit words of advocacy of election or
defeat of a candidate."). This gave rise to the oft-mocked "magic words" doctrine which was
employed by corporate and union entities to ensure their independently expended campaign
ads were issue advocacy, as opposed to candidate advocacy.
...Id. at 44-45.
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or apparent corruption.'

This was not the end of the story. An important development
in this distinction occurred between McConnell..3 and Wisconsin
Right to Life.114 In McConnell, the Court upheld a provision of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which prohibited "elec-

tioneering communications" by corporate entities referencing a
clearly identified candidate within thirty days of a primary, or within
sixty days of a general election.' 15 The Court reasoned that such ads
were the "functional equivalent of express advocacy" and prone to
16
the same concerns which justify greater regulation of the same.'

This determination was considered a significant departure from Buckley's grant of First Amendment protection to campaign-related

speech. 1 7 Three years and two justices later, the Court faced an asapplied challenge to this same provision in Wisconsin Right to Life." 8
Feeling constrained by, but loath to overrule, McConnell, the Court,
with Chief Justice Roberts writing, instead narrowed the definition of
"functional equivalent" of express advocacy to communications
"susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43-44.
113McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
114FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007). The first decision in this case,
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006), held that McConnell did not foreclose
as-applied challenges to electioneering communications and remanded the case back to the
district court for an as-applied determination. Id. at 412.
"l 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (West 2009); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189-90, 194.
116 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
117See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell v. FEC: Not Senator Buckley's FirstAmendment, 3 ELECTION L.J. 127, 141 (2004); Erik S. Jaffe, McConnell v. FEC: RationingSpeech
to Prevent "Undue" Influence, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 245, 281 (2004).
118 Wis. Right to Life, 127 S.Ct. at 2661 (2006).
1l2
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'
vote for or against a specific candidate."119
The 30/60-day prohibi-

tion stood, but its application was limited to the point of evisceration.
3.

ReportingRequirements

A third finding in Buckley was that reporting requirements
were constitutional. 120

While implicating core First Amendment

speech, reporting requirements satisfied strict scrutiny as being a narrow ancillary requirement necessary for enforcement of constitutional
contribution limits. 12' However, Buckley created an exception for a
minor party that can make a substantial showing with specific evidence that reporting their donor's identities would subject them to
harassment or reprisal.12 2 This exception was later applied to campaign disbursements, but remains extremely narrow by imposing a
substantial burden of proof on the candidate or party seeking to invoke the exception. 2 3 Also, as one would assume, laws requiring
disclosure of independent expenditures advocating a given electoral
24
outcome have not stood very long in light of the First Amendment. 1
4.

ExpenditureLimits

Campaign expenditure limits (whether by the candidate or
private parties) are unconstitutional as bearing no rational relationId. at 2667.
12' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80-82.
121 Id. at 82.
122 Id. at 74.
123 Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 93, 95 (1982).
124 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995). This of course, is
aside from relying on Buckley's prohibition on independent expenditure limits. Id. at 354.
This ruling stems from the understanding that a speaker is afforded a right to anonymity in
her exercise of First Amendment free speech rights. Id. at 357.
119
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ship to actual or apparent corruption.125 In Randall, the Court considered Vermont's expenditure limits.

26

Its ruling on them ought to

prove the death knell for expenditure limits as a means of campaign
finance reform, given that Vermont's limits were as narrowly drawn
as they could be. They were generous, adjusted for inflation, and
were specifically engineered to guarantee a candidate's ability to
campaign effectively. 127 They were presented as a rational means of
achieving the new state interest discussed above: 128 that of reducing
the amount of time state officials spent raising funds as opposed to
running the state. 129 The Court refused to find a compelling state in-

terest, however, reasoning that to do so would be tantamount to overruling Buckley (and rewriting its campaign jurisprudence) by justify-

ing expenditure limits.

30

Furthermore, as narrowly tailored as

Vermont's expenditure limits were, they were not narrowly tailored
enough to the actual apparent corruption interest 3'1 and the only conclusion to be drawn is that none ever could be.
5.

The Donor/Litigant Problem

"[I]n the most extreme of cases," due process entitles a party

125 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-48.

126 Randall, 548 U.S. at 240.
127 Id. at 237-38. Vermont allowed a gubernatorial candidate to spend $300,000, and
other state-wide officers $100,000, with state senators' limits calculated according to the
population of their district. Id. Incumbents were only allowed to spend between 85% and
90% of what their challengers could spend. Id.
128See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
129 Id.

at 240.

130Id. at 246. The Court's logic was not entirely circuitous; it also cited an amici brief to
hold that Buckley had in fact considered the candidate- time-conservation interest in rendering its ruling, even though it was not mentioned in the Buckley opinion. Id.
131 Id.
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to recusal of a judge.1 32 Such an instance arises where the judge has a
personal interest in the outcome of the case 3 3 or some previous involvement with the party which gives rise to a question of the fairness of a subsequent determination.

34

According to the "do-

nor/litigant problem," questions of impropriety arise where a donor
later appears as a litigant before a donee/judge. Were this scenario
precluded or regulated by law, it would have a chilling effect on protected donor conduct and hence the finance of judicial campaigns.
Currently, there is no constitutional or statutory law that
speaks to the donor/litigant problem. However, the Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari in the case of Caperton v. A. T. Massey
Coal Co., Inc.' 35 to resolve this issue in November of 2008. Caperton addressed whether a litigant has a due process right to the appearance of an unbiased hearing, which would entitle the litigant to
recusal of a presiding judge who received substantial campaign dona36
tions from the litigant's adversary.
Under facts as egregious as those presented in Caperton,'37 it
132Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986).
113 Id. at 821-22.

134 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 135-37 (1955) (holding that under a law allowing a
judge to be a "one man grand jury," when a judge gains an indictment against a defendant
said judge cannot then preside over the defendant's trial without violating the defendant's
due process right to a fair tribunal).
131 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008).
136 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc, 129 S. Ct. 593
(No. 08-22), 2008 WL 2676568, * 1 (2008).
137 The donor/litigant, Blankenship, spent $3 million in 2004 to elect a colleague, Brent
Benjamin, Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, over an incumbent.
Id. at 2-3. Justice Benjamin refused to recuse himself when Massey Coal, of which
Blankenship was CEO and President, appeared before him and proceeded to cast the deciding vote to vacate a $50 million jury verdict against Massey Coal. Editorial, Too Generous,
N.Y.TMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at 8. The case had previously come before the court and the $50
million verdict had been vacated. Id. Caperton was granted a rehearing after photos surfaced of West Virginia Chief Justice Elliot Maynard and Blakenship on vacation together in
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is not impossible to imagine even the current Court imposing some
kind of ceiling on the donor/litigant conflict, though a consideration
of the claims counsel against preparing for one. Petitioners staked
their due process claim on the "appearance of bias," 138 a notoriously
slender reed, 139 and the question presented necessarily raised the
question of where a donor's First Amendment right to make political
expenditures and the Petitioner's right to court access 14 cease to be
coterminous, which makes the Petitioner's job considerably more difficult than it would appear at first blush, especially in light of both
White and L6pez Torres.
Ultimately, there are four possible substantive outcomes of
Caperton.1 4 ' The Court could 1) mandate recusal in all donor/litigant
conflicts; 2) impose an actual monetary limit before triggering a
recusal mandating donor/litigant conflict; 3) impose a relative monetary limit;

42

or 4) expressly deny the due process claim, thereby rele-

gating the issue to resolution by relevant state bar associations, legislatures and constitutions.
The first three outcomes would work in varying degrees to
overrule or at least dilute White, particularly if it is not assumed that
the litigant's due process donor/litigant claim would extend to her
Monte Carlo during the pendency of the appeal. Id.
138Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 593 (No. 08-22).
139Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1371-72 (7th Cir. 1994).

140For a discussion on the ubiquitous yet elusive right to court access, see Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002).

141There is a fifth possible outcome. Though having granted certiorari, it is conceivable,

though unlikely, the Court could decline to rule on the due process issue on jurisdictional

grounds. Regardless, in so ruling the Court would be impliedly ruling that it was state bar
associations, legislatures and constitutions.
142The limits in these instances would be, as the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence
has borne out, implied as opposed to specific.
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adversary's attorneys. The reality is that businesses often appear before the judges of a given jurisdiction who are in a position to, and
often do, exercise their First Amendment right to donate to every sitting judge's campaign. In places like Albany, firms such as Powers
and Santola, LLP, 14 3 which donated $20,000 to Justice Teresi's campaign in 2007,144 litigate so many cases within Teresi's district that
even the avoidance of a conflict without incredible inconvenience
would be impossible. In such cases, mandated recusal would amount
to a ban on personal campaign expenditures for those wishing to
practice in or appear before the courts of a given jurisdiction. Even
in the second instance, as also seen in White, it is unlikely the Court
will impose a condition on the exercise of First Amendment personal
political expenditure rights.145 The third outcome would be largely
unworkable, making the exercise of one donor's rights contingent on
the decision of others to exercise their own constitutional rights. Finally, it is exceedingly unlikely the conservative Roberts Court will
enthusiastically discover a due process right to apparently unbiased
judicial recourse, particularly if it did not find a First Amendment
46
wrong in L6pez Torres.1

6.

The Constitutionalityof New York's Finance
Regulations

As discussed above, New York's contribution limits are gen143Powers & Santola, LLP is a prominent upstate New York law firm with offices in
Saratoga and Albany, both of which are in Justice Teresi's Third Judicial District. Powers &

Santola, LLP, http://www.powers-santola.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
144 See Committee to Re-Elect Justice Joseph C. Teresi, supra note 56.
141 Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2673.
146 See L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. at 797-98.
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erous (well above the lows invalidated in Randall) and its attempts at
limiting expenditures have been few and far between. As such, New
York-specific campaign finance case law is rare. 47 Moreover, for
procedural and practical reasons, challenges to campaign finance systems are hashed out in federal, rather than state court. 148 The only recent blip on the New York campaign finance law radar occurred
when a law prohibiting expenditures by candidates for state office
during primary campaigns1 49 faced simultaneous federal and state
challenges.1 50 New York's Third Department was the victor by five
days in an apparent race to invalidate via Buckley. 15 1 In an earlier
case, an attempt to invalidate New York's reporting requirements was
denied.5 2 However, taking everything into account, things have been
quiet on this particular front.

141 See 50 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Elections § 496 (2009) (citing, aside from statute, a scarce and
disparate group of opinions, without a source of state-wide jurisdiction to explain New
York's campaign receipt and expenditure law).
148The only party with standing to challenge speech and conduct regulations is the candidate herself, while numerous better-funded parties may challenge expenditure or contribution. The candidate, pressed for time and money, will not subject speech or conduct regulations to First Amendment scrutiny unless faced with an unfavorable advisory opinion or
sanction by a state agency, at which time, an Article 78 action will be filed in state court.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney 2009) (governing appeals of administrative decisions by
New York State agencies in New York State courts). At the same time, political fund-raisers,
their livelihood at stake, will peremptorily challenge any threatening legislative developments at the first opportunity within the federal judiciary, which is more hostile to campaign
finance.
149 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 2-126 (McKinney 2007). This law was a strange one. It had been
on the books in one form or another since 1911 and had survived Buckley in the face of periodic challenge, most recently in 1999, in Baran v. Giambra, 265 A.D.2d 796 (4th Dep't
1999). In Baran, the law faced the strict scrutiny demanded by Buckley and survived. Id. at
797.
150 Kermani v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 487 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (N.D.N.Y. 2006);
Avella v. Batt, 33 A.D.3d 77, 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006).
151 Kermani, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 109-10; Avella, 33 A.D.3d at 85.
152 Herschaft v. N.Y. City Campaign Fin. Bd., 127 F. Supp. 2d 164, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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Conclusions

Though the Court has strayed from it, Buckley remains the
post to which campaign finance jurisprudence and reform is tethered. 5 3 The fealty with which the Roberts Court regards Buckley
leaves little doubt that its tenants will stand for the foreseeable future.
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts went out of his way in Wisconsin Right
to Life to foreclose any doubt that, at least for the time being, his
Court is fundamentally opposed to any campaign finance reform
54

whatsoever. 1

Subsequently, it can be said that the interests of the Court, as
keepers of the Constitution, are far more limited in this instance than
those of American society and democracy in general. There certainly
is an interest in both keeping officials honest and ensuring they are
perceived as such. But there is also an interest in keeping them at
their desks, and in ensuring the democratic process remains a respite
from the undemocratic economic striation that governs every other
aspect of public life. The former interests have been deemed compelling while the latter have not. Thus, in seeking to realize an anticorruption interest, the First Amendment may be intruded upon, but
in realizing all other interests, the First Amendment forecloses the

' Randall, 548 U.S. at 242.
114 Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2672 ("Enough is enough. Issue ads like WRTL's are

by no means equivalent to contributions, and the quid-pro-quo corruption interest cannot
justify regulating them. To equate WRTL's ads with contributions is to ignore their value as
political speech."). Six months after this utterance was handed down, Senator Christopher
Dodd was campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination in Iowa on a customized
bus provided by the unregulated and unreported generosity of the International Union of Fire
Fighters. Other candidates took full advantage of Robert's hostility as well. Leslie Wayne,
Hands Untied by Ruling, Outside Groups Pour Money into Race, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE,
Jan. 2, 2008, at 5.
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most effective options. As such, judicial election reformers are put in
the awkward position of simultaneously subverting and complying
with the Constitution if they seek to achieve these interests through
law or policymaking, since all reforms must ostensibly be anticorruption measures.
This conclusion must be emphasized that any tampering with
the electoral process, in either its conduct or finance, must be narrowly tailored to the anti-corruption interest. The party bias interest
considered in the judicial conduct/speech cases is essentially the anticorruption interest as it applies to judges, for what is a corrupt judge
but one who favors one party over another for reasons not pertaining
to her office. Further, the possibilities presented in White by the suggestion that there might be a compelling state interest in openmindedness are limited.'55

It is difficult to imagine whether this

would allow for anything the anti-corruption interest would not, and
it is even harder to imagine any legislation that could be so narrowly
tailored as to achieve something so vague as "open-mindedness."

156

Therefore, though the public-officer-time-conservation interest presented in Randall is worthy of far better treatment than the Court was
willing to give it, an anti-corruption interest is all legislators have to
work with in reforming both the conduct and financing of judicial

'5

156

See White, 536 U.S. at 778.
See id. at 780.
A candidate who says "If elected, I will vote to uphold the legislature's
power to prohibit same-sex marriages" will positively be breaking his
word if he does not do so (although one would be naive not to recognize
that campaign promises are-by long democratic tradition-the least
binding form of human commitment).
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elections.
I1.

WHAT MAKES A GOOD JUDICIAL ELECTION?

After determining how judicial elections work in New York
State and gauging their constitutionality, it must be ascertained exactly what the objective is for judicial elections before rendering any
subjective judgment regarding their efficacy.
At first this might seem simple: the purpose of a judicial selection process is to attract and select good judges to the bench. But
embedded in this answer are the two crucial questions:

1) what

makes good judges; and 2) do New York's judicial election laws attract them? Since this Comment's analysis does not question the use
of elections as opposed to appointment, a third question is implied:
do New York's judicial elections achieve democratic ideals?
A.

What Makes a Good Judge?
1.

Conduct

In asking what constitutes a good judge, the reality that judges
are only human must be kept in mind. Ensconced as they are in
"chambers," exalted upon "benches" and disembodied beneath
"robes," they are people and, more importantly, citizens complete
with all accompanying preconceptions and prejudices.' 57 Furthermore, it is hardly desirable to have a judge who has not devoted care-

157 See Vincent Martin Bonventre, JudicialActivism, Judges' Speech, and Merit Selec-

tion: Conventional Wisdom and Nonsense, 68 ALB. L. REv. 557, 562 (2005) (stating that
"[a] judicial robe is not an ideological lobotomy").
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ful consideration to the law and society and come to conclusions
about both.'58

Acceptance of this reality, while it may appear an

abandonment of one's notions of the ideal bench, does not foreclose
the achievement of traditional judiciary-specific interests.
At the core of these interests is the fact that a judge should
manage her court as an institution of law. This requires certain and
159 comprecise interpretation of regulation, statute and precedent,

bined with a character, which will engender the respect and veneration without which the law cannot thrive. 160 As with any social institution, legal systems included, the New York judiciary can only
function when people respect and obey it.' 6 1 Certainty of interpretation serves to engender respect and obedience by limiting caprice,
which in turn stabilizes confidence in the judiciary itself and shores
up vulnerability to subversion and de-legitimization.'

62

Resistance

58 See White, 536 U.S. at 778 (noting that "even if it were possible to select judges who

did not have preconceived views on legal issues, it would hardly be desirable to do so.").
159 For a useful synthesis of the debate out of which this assertion arises, see Roberto
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 561-76
(1983).
160 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating, in pertinent part, "[j]udges... shall hold their offices during good behavior ..
"); N.Y. RULES OF CT. § 100.2(A) (McKinney 2009) (stating, in pertinent part, "[a] judge shall ... act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary").
161 Respect and obedience are inspired in a number of ways. Certainty of interpretation
and venerability are the traditional tools of a judiciary toward this end. United States history
is replete with examples of the crises, which flow when people refuse to respect and obey the
judiciary. See, e.g., J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT
AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 131-39 (Oxford Univ. Press 1981) (1979) (highlighting resistance to busing in Richmond and Charlotte after Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
162 GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND
FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES 39-51 (2007) (outlining the malarkey surrounding President Jackson and Georgia's refusal to obey the Supreme Court's functional reversal of Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 568 (1823) (holding the United States has right to title of all
land within its boundaries), by issuing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (holding the federal government could not interfere in Native American sovereignty rights)).
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and undermining of the legitimacy of a court are often accompanied
63
by sudden, poorly explained reversals of precedent. 1
2.

Appearance

The required judicial character is bolstered and reflected by
the physical presentation of the courtroom, of which the judge is the
focal point.

Physically, a court is designed along the traditional

model you find in synagogues, mosques, or churches. The judge enters and we rise. She sits beneath her halo, typically the seal of the
state, on a comfortable leather throne while we are permitted space
on rigid wooden benches. Citizens appear before her, approaching
only with her permission, and only a select few are permitted to mutter incomprehensible invocations, which she approves or disapproves
of for reasons only the anointed could ever comprehend. Her voice
amplified, we must obey every word. 164 The effect of this imagery on
the collective conscience of the polity is invaluable to the maintenance of the judiciary, but it is undermined when the judge's character strays from the social ideal of the enlightened. Therefore, a good
judge should appear to embody, or at least not violate, the ideal of the
65
"dispassionate and enlightened one" in all aspects of her life. 1
The New York Court Rules enumerate a myriad of other in-

163

See, e.g., MERTON L. DILLON, THE ABOLITIONISTS 233-35 (1975) (noting how Dred

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), radicalized the abolitionist movement); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 758 (1994) (detailing the efforts of anti-abortion
protestors to subvert a court order).
164 See generally New York v. Moulton, 374 N.E.2d 1243, 1244 (N.Y. 1978). For an interesting parable further blurring the lines between religious and legal judgment, see Amalia
D. Kessler, Enforcing Virtue:

Social Norms and Self-Interest in an Eighteenth-Century

Merchant Court, 22 LAW & HiST. REv. 71 (2004).
165 See N.Y. RULES OFCT. § 100.3(A).
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terests that are relevant, even after White, and are not forsaken by the
conclusions just reached. 166 Instead, the enumeration of the two essential "good judge" qualities, consistent interpretation and promotion of veneration, serve to consolidate these interests so that the efficacy of New York Judicial Election Law as a judicial selection
process can be efficiently analyzed. 167 Note that under these two
broad interests fall more specific ones, like zealous discharge of duties, efficient court management, etc.
B.

What Makes a Good Election?

Finally, the purpose of judicial elections as a democratic exercise must be considered. "[G]overnments are instituted among men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."1 68 This,
the underlying philosophy of American governance, requires that all
power be traceable to the will of the people and the will of the people
is most peaceably ascertained through elections. Further, elections
are a practical and fundamental means of undermining unwanted political development.

69

The purpose of an election, then, is to estab-

lish and divine the consent of voters and provide an opportunity for
the polity to undermine unwanted developments in lawmaking. Each
166

Id.

167 This Comment declines to make a distinction between "actual" and "appearance" of

any of these interests based on the idea that this distinction simply is not useful. Aside from
the fact that one typically begets the other, that both are desirable makes distinguishing between the two essentially redundant.
168 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

169 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 252 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) (noting that
"[a] dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul [sic] on the government; but
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions"); see also Randall,
548 U.S. at 248-49 (observing that "contribution limits that are too low can also harm the
electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing democraticaccountability") (emphasis added).
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of these requires the participation of a polity informed of the government's work during the previous term and of its ability to exercise
control over it.
IV.

THE PERFORMANCE OF NEW YORK'S JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

The questions, then, have become whether New York judicial
election laws: 1) attract and select judges who interpret the law consistently; 2) who engender respect and veneration for the bench; 3)
while encouraging public participation in the democratic process, and
4) providing an opportunity to divine and respond to the will of the
governed? In order to analyze and answer these questions, the election-related purposes, and the good judge-related purposes are considered separately, and then together.
A.

Public Participation

Only seventeen percent of New Yorkers vote in judicial elections, 170 while forty-one percent do not, even while voting for other
candidates in a given election. 171 In fact, sixty-five percent of New
172
Yorkers do not even know Supreme Court justices are elected.
When asked why, fifty-eight percent of voters cited lack of knowl-

170

COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 19, app.

A, at 36. As part of the mandate bestowed upon them by Chief Judge Kaye, the Commission
enlisted the help of the Albany Government Law Center to conduct a rare, if not utterly
comprehensive, survey of public perceptions of judicial elections, which included a series of
questionnaires and focus groups, answered by and composed of a variety of citizens in key
areas of the state.
171 Id. (noting that seventy-five percent, when voting for judges, forgot which they had
voted for in exit polls. .. [and] [f]orty-eight percent did not realize Court of Appeals judges
were appointed).
172Id.
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edge about judicial candidates as the reason they did not vote. 173
But lack of information is a key objective of New York's judicial election laws. Speech restrictions prevent candidates from informing the electorate, except through winks and nods,17 4 as to how
they will rule on issues likely to appear before the court or make any
statement to suggest they might not be impartial. 175 Without discussion which might transgress these rules, any interest in judicial elections average New Yorkers may harbor is left to whither on the vine.
The speech prohibitions fail in practice as well. In In re Shanley, for
example, a judicial candidate's assertion that she was a "law and order" candidate was held proper, 176 while in In re Watson, statements
that a candidate would "work with" and "assist" police were not. 177
Is there any material difference in the effect of these two statements?
In both cases the message to local prosecutors and police was that in
the candidate's court, they would get the benefit of the doubt. The
speech prohibitions abandon actual impartiality for its appearance,
and only where the lay voter is concerned. This only serves to discourage participation and hence undermines the establishment of
consent.
Further, fifteen percent of registered voters consider the judicial election process inimical per se.178 This is likely the fault of New
173

174

Id.
See In re Shanley, 774 N.E.2d 735, 736 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that a judicial candi-

date's use of the term "law and order" to describe herself was not in contravention of N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.5 (A)(4)(d)(i), (ii)).
175 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.5 (A)(4)(a).
171 Shanley, 774 N.E.2d at 736.
177 In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 2003).
178 COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 19, app.
G, at 5.
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York electoral politics generally, but provisions requiring disclosure
of campaign donations17 9 are the only rules that mandate the sort of
openness that could restore a voter's faith. However, the allowance
of contributions at all is contrary to faith in the electoral process insofar as New Yorkers have faith in it as a means and ends of democratic
equality.

80

Private campaign financing is a system whereby citizens

may purchase premium access to democratic institutions. It creates
classes of citizens based on who can afford to pay for the attention of
government officers and those who cannot. This clearly contravenes
the ideals of American equality at necessarily dilutes the enthusiasm
of the vast majority of New Yorkers who are not in a position to donate enough money to earn the special attention of candidates. Once
again, determination of the popular will is undermined, this time
through alienation.
B.

Attracting Good Candidates

The question we'll ask first is whether New York's judicial
campaign laws attract judges who will interpret the law consistently,
before asking whether they attract judges who will promote veneration of the bench. Currently, candidates are anointed via the party
nomination process. Since the analysis is limited to elections, and
since the nomination process is hopefully on the verge of reform, it
must admittedly ignore the dominant factor in candidate selection and
179

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.5 (A)(4)(g).

The Commission to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections found further that
seven percent of the people did not care that much, four percent held the belief that their vote
did not matter, and sixteen percent believed people always voted in judicial elections.
180

COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 19, app. E, at

22.
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focus solely on the role elections have in it.
1.

Consistent Interpretation

With the exception of district, town, village, or city courts, the
New York Constitution requires that judges have been admitted to
practice law in New York for ten years.' 8' By extension the requirement means that a candidate must have gone to law school, graduated, and survived ten years of practice without being disbarred.
However, New York's 2,164 district, town, village, and city court
judges (sixty-seven percent of the state's judiciary), the majority of
whom are elected, 182 are not required to have a law degree-1

83 in-

deed, eighty-two percent of them do not. 184 At least in the first instance, the law requires the development of a familiarity with the law
during which any caprice of the candidate will theoretically have
been vetted. Because the underlying premise of the legal profession
is that the intricacies of law are beyond the ken of the average citizen,
elections themselves as an appointive mechanism cannot be relied
upon to favor consistent judicial interpretation. Keeping in mind this
foundational truism, the bar membership exemption for district, town,
village, or city court judges8 5 leads us to the conclusion that there is
nothing inherent to the judicial election law which encourages the
election of candidates with consistent legal interpretation.
The Independent Judicial Election Qualification Commis181 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 20(a).
182 COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 19, at 5.

183N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 20(c).
184John Caher, ComplaintsAgainst Judges Rose in 2004, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 29, 2005, at 1.
185 Town and village judges are required to take a training course. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, §
20(c).
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sion's (JEQC) mandate1 86 would screen for, inter alia, those traits
which lend themselves to consistent legal interpretation (education,
experience, etc.). The JEQC was established by administrative enactment in February 2007187 but its evaluations during its first run in
the Fall of 2007 were not thorough. They were issued in a series of
press releases regarding individual districts.188 None of the 127 candidates screened earned anything but a "qualified" rating and no explanation for the rating was proffered except on general terms. The
Commission clearly failed in its mandate to inform or inspire confidence in the public regarding the judicial election process.
There was little improvement during the 2008 elections.
Though the Commission of the Second Department deemed five candidates "not qualified" and the Fourth Department deemed one candidate "not qualified," the reasons for the designation were not readily apparent. 189 The First and Third Department Commissions did not

186 See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
187 N.Y. RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE § 150. 1.
188 See Press Release, Third Dep't Indep. Judicial Election Qualification CommissionSixth Judicial District (Aug. 27, 2007); Press Release, Third Dep't Indep. Judicial Election
Qualification Commissions-Fourth Judicial District (Oct. 3 2007); Press Release, Third
Dep't Indep. Judicial Election Qualification Commissions-Third Judicial District (Oct. 10,
2007), http://courts.state.ny.us/ad3/JEQC/Qualified%2OCandidates.html (last visited Mar.
28, 2009); Press Release, First Dep't Indep. Judicial Election Qualification CommissionsFirst Judicial District Independent Judicial Election Qualification Commission Announces
2007),
Candidates
(July
17,
Qualified
http://www.judicialreports.com/attachments/Jason/PR07l7.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2009);
Press Release, Second Dep't Indep. Judicial Election Qualification CommissionsIndependent Judicial Election Qualification Commissions for the Second Judicial Depart2007),
ment
Announce
Qualified
Candidates,
(Sept.
14,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad2/IJEQC/IJEQC2.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2008).
189 INDEP. JUDICIAL ELECTION QUALIFICATION COMMISSIONS, 2008 FINAL LIST OF RATED

CANDIDATES

2-3

(2008),

available

http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad2/IJEQC/2008RatedCandidates.pdf;
ELECTION QUALIFICATION

COMMISSIONS,

2008

CANDIDATE

INDEP.

at

JUDICIAL

RATINGS: EIGHTH JUDICIAL

DISTRICT, http://www.courts.state. ny.us/ad4/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
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see fit to deem any candidate to be less than qualified.' 90
Unfortunately, these designations, the product of a new and
haphazard commission, constitute the only systematic attempt to
gauge the capacity for legal consistency among New York's judicial
candidates. Hence, there is no reliable barometer available to determine whether candidates capable of consistent judicial interpretation
are in fact attracted. 191
2.

Promotion of Veneration
a.

Systemic/Legal Guarantees

If judicial election laws do not attract judges capable of consistent legal interpretation, they speak squarely to the candidate's
promotion of veneration. The New York Constitution forbids holding other public offices or practicing law in a way that might risk a
conflict of interest.

92

There are other, similar qualifications inherent

in the nature of the elections imposed by Part 100. For example, in
order to conduct a campaign under this law, a judicial candidate
(typically a politically active person) must at least outwardly with190 Press Release, Indep. Judicial Election Qualification Commissions-First Judicial District (Sept. 3, 2008), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/adl/press release-2008-1stJD.pdf
(last visited Mar. 11, 2009); Press Release, Indep. Judicial Election Qualification Commissions-Twelfth
Judicial
District
(Sept.
3,
2008),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad l/press-release-2008-12thJD.pdf (last visited Mar.
11, 2009); Press Release, Indep. Judicial Election Qualification Commissions-2008 Commission Ratings (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ad3/JEQC/2008-QualifiedCandidates.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
191 A seemingly obvious determinant of judicial consistency would be reversal rates.
However, no systematic reporting of reversal rates is available, much less reversal rates for
legal misinterpretation as opposed to judicial misconduct. See DeCrescenzo v. Gonzalez,
847 N.Y.S.2d 236 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007).
192 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 20(b)(1)-(4).
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draw from political life and must subject herself to vague provisions
regarding the maintenance of the "dignity of the office."'

93

She must

go so far as to ensure that her family does the same. 194 In this way, a
candidacy for judicial office is unique. A candidate for judicial office
is required by law to reconsider the conduct of her entire life in light
of her pursuit of office.

95

The effect of this is similar to the "awakening the conscience"' 196 an oath ismeant to impart on a trial witness, whereby a

judicial candidate is made to acknowledge the gravity of the authority
she seeks via submission to Part 100. The awakening for judicial
candidates is more concrete however, for in subjecting herself to Part
100, a judicial candidate, unlike typical candidates, submits to the jurisdiction of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct,
the New York State Board of Election, and the Independent Judicial
Qualifications Commission at a time when her actions are going to be
heavily scrutinized, if not by the commissions and board independently, then by those seeking to bar the candidate's election.'97 The
result is, at the very least, a one-month period in which a judicial
candidate is tested on how well she "uphold[s] the dignity of the
bench." 198
193N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.5 (A)(1).
194Id. § 100.5 (A)(4)(a).
195 Id.
196 FED. R. EVID. 603.
197 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.0(A). As seen below, that such people exist
is not a "given" and is in fact rare.
198 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-158(5) (requiring that a judicial district convention be held be-

tween the first Tuesday after the third Monday in September and the fourth Monday in September); Id. § 8-100(c) (placing the general election on the Tuesday after the first Monday in
November). In practice, this period is much longer. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
22 § 100.0(Q) (2007) (defining "window period" as applied to finance regulations, as begin-
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Taking a more subjective approach, the 2005 Commission on
Judicial Conduct conducted 260 investigations based on a record
number of complaints-i ,565-resulting in approximately ninetythree reprimands to elected judges.

99

In 2004 the commission con-

ducted 255 full investigations, which resulted in twenty public sanctions and thirty-five private warnings.200

In 2005, therefore, ap-

proximately three percent of all elected judges (including town and
village judges) and approximately four percent of full-time elected
judges were reprimanded, marking six years of sustained reprimandgrowth. 20

During a similar period, Massachusetts, which employs a

merit-based judicial appointment system, 20 2 "informally resolved" investigations of two of its judges and dismissed charges with concern
but after investigation against 6 of its judges. 20 3 Thus, two percent of
its 410-member judiciary was reprimanded in some way.20 4 Meanwhile, Texas, which selects all of its judges through partisan election,
also disciplined only two percent of its 3,661 judges. 2 5 This brief
comparison is too cursory and uncontrolled to justify broad conclu-

ning nine months before a nomination convention); Id. § 100.0(A) (defining a candidate as
anyone who has publicly announced her candidacy).
199 John Caher, ComplaintsAgainst Judges on the Rise, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 2006, at 1. The
majority of these reprimands, fifty-eight, were issued against town or village court judges,
who are subject to local regulation as to whether they are elected. Id. at 3-4.
200 Id. at 1.
201 Id.
202

American

Judicature

Soc'y,

Judicial

Selection

Methods

in

the

States,

http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel_ state-select-map.asp#top (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
203 COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT ANNUAL REPORT 2005

9 (2005), availableat http://www.mass.gov/cjc/2005_Annual-Report.pdf.
204 The Massachusetts Court System, Chart of the Massachusetts Court System,
http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/structure-color.pdf
28, 2009).

(last visited Mar.

205 TEXAS COMM'N OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, FISCAL YEAR 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 17-18

(2005), availableat http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/rpts/AR-FY05.pdf.
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sions, but it is enough to conclude that New York's judicial election
laws are not facing crises for failure to select judges who promote
veneration and respect for the judiciary, though we should be concerned that the numbers are relatively high. This conclusion is bolstered by public opinion: forty-two percent of New Yorkers feel
elected judges are doing a good job, and thirty-nine percent believe
they are doing a "just fair job. 2 °6 Only nine percent feel they are
"poor. ' ' 20 7 The slightly poorer performance of New York's judiciary
compared to its counterparts in Massachusetts and Texas is a cause
for concern, it's clear that there is no revolution in the works.
b.

Campaign Finance

Insofar as New York's Judicial Election laws provide for the
private financing of judicial campaigns,2 °8 they pose a threat to consistent legal interpretation by risking bias in favor of donor/litigants
and pose a threat to the veneration of the bench in perpetuating perceived bias among voters.20 9
The belief that private contributions to political campaigns are
offered, at least the vast majority of time, without the intent to garner
special treatment, is a stifling naivet6, which any reconstitution of
New York's judicial election process must avoid. To return to the
206

COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 19, app.

G, at 2.
207 Id. This left three percent believing that New York's judges were doing an excellent
job, with an honest eight percent recusing themselves for lack of knowledge. As acknowledged with the veneration promotion interest, job performance and perceived job importance, while separable in other professions, are indistinguishable for judges.
208 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.5(A)(5).
209 COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 19, app.
G, at 2.
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elections examined earlier,21 ° judicial contributions came from local
law firms and attorneys, as one would expect, but local construction
companies also made significant donations and a number of donors
were not from New York at all, including one man from Ocean
Ridge, Florida who donated $10,000 to the Teresi campaign.2 ' It can
be assumed that when Donald Led Duke, Chairman of BBL Construction Services LLC,21 2 whose building projects include the Albany Family Court and the New York Court of Appeals Hall, 1 3 donated $5,000 to the Committee to Re-Elect Justice Joseph C. Teresi,
he was merely adding his voice to the electoral debate, but to do so
would be to ignore a critical problem.
In acknowledging the problem, the mindset of a large donor is
best understood according to the horse racing model.214 A local lawyer, for example, sees her donation not as aid to ensure a favored
candidate wins, but rather as a bet placed on a candidate she thinks
will win.215 Large donors invest in candidates rather than donate to
them. Whether undemocratic campaign contributions translate to un210 See infra Part IV.A.
211 See Committee to Elect Judge Cahill, supra note 58.
212 Michael DeMasi, Troy, in Need of Hotel Rooms, is Beneficiary of Competing Projects,
THE
BUSINESS
REV.,
Sept.
21,
http://www.bizjoumals.com/albany/stories/2007/09/24/story9.html?jst--s-cn-hl

2007,
(last visited

Mar. 28, 2009).
213 BBL

Construction
Services,
Completed
Projects,
http://bblconstructionservices.com/projects/completed.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
Other Albany area projects include the Alfred E. Smith building, the New York State Office
of the Comptroller, the Empire State Plaza parking garage, the Albany County Justice Center, and the Greene County Municipal Building. Id. BBL has also appeared before Justice
Teresi. In September of 2007, the Third Department overturned a motion for summary
judgment Justice Teresi granted BBL in a case involving a worker who was injured during
construction of the Court of Appeals Hall. See Gadani v. Dormitory Auth. of the State of
N.Y., 43 A.D.3d 1218, 1221-22 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2007).
214 STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS 10-12 (2006).
215 Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

45

Touro Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 [2012], Art. 3

1048

TOURO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 25

democratic tendencies among elected judges is unclear, but what is
clear is thirty-eight percent of New Yorkers feel campaign contributions have "a great deal" of influence and forty-five percent believe
they have "some,

216

influence over the decision making of judges.

This alone undermines veneration of the bench, but the risk posed by
the sanctioned assault upon judicial candidates by improper interests
also imperils consistent legal interpretation via the promotion of party
bias.
It is important to note that there is no legal bar to party bias in
favor of donors, and it is not likely that Caperton will change that
significantly. 1 7 While there are laws clearly mandating recusal for
reasons of "interest," 21 8 there is no law requiring a recusal where a
campaign donor is a litigant before the judge.
Regardless, New Yorkers are presently afforded no real guarantee that frequent litigant donations are not used to influence judicial
decision making. As mentioned earlier, Part 100 prohibits a judicial
candidate from personally soliciting funds, but allows her to do so
through committees she personally appoints.

This is an attempt to

soften the impact of the donor/litigant problem, but fails for the same
reason the Shanley and Watson2 19 distinction does. Any shielding effect the solicitation prohibition has is illusory. Who and how much
one donates to a judicial campaign is public knowledge by law;

216 COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 19, app.

G, at 2.
217 See supra,Part II.B.5.
218 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 30-14 (McKinney 2007).
219 See supra text accompanying notes 177-78; In re Shanley, 774 N.E.2d 735, 736 (N.Y.
2002); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 2003).
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hence, it is not realistic to think a judge would not know to whom she
owes her office and to act accordingly if she were so inclined.
Therefore, that New York State's judicial election laws serve
to educate the public-but not in a way which encourages public participation. At best, it maintains veneration of the bench, and may or
may not attract qualified candidates.

The inquiry moves now to

whether it is worthwhile to improve judicial elections, and if so, how.
C.

Tactical Groundwork for
Improvement

Any modification of the system of private campaign finance
must prioritize the campaign expenditures discussed above with an
eye towards the purposes of electoral judicial selection: promoting
and maintaining a good bench while promoting democratic ideals. In
this way, the ends served by the $79,220.56 spent by Justice Teresi's
campaign on public awareness becomes essential to both the promotion of democracy via education and the maintenance of a good
bench, presuming democratic election is the favored leadership selection mode. For the public, the $15,098.62 spent on fundraising is an
accommodation to our system of private campaign finance; a necessary investment to raise the funds to educate the polity. Notwithstanding the conception of campaign donation as a democratic exercise, the image of the judge's committee drumming up political
support, even in the candidate's absence, undermines veneration of
and respect for the bench. 220 Though no one could seriously argue
220 COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note

19, app.

G, at 2.
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the New York bench engages in any systematic preference for donors, party bias is the inherent risk of private campaign finance. The
same reasoning de-prioritizes the $5,188 spent on event tickets.
Thus, reformers in the public interest must understand the money
spent on fundraising and event tickets is expendable as either unnecessary in light of other solutions, or as serving the interest of the candidate where it opposes that of the public.
Money spent educating the public is essential to the establishment of consent, but the $79,220.56 spent by the Teresi campaign
and the $282,706.30 from which it was drawn must be considered in
light of this education's essential components and the means available for achieving them. In the democratic process, education of the
public requires that 1) information be communicated to the public
and that 2) the public be afforded the opportunity to weigh one another's impression of it. In an election, the judicial candidate can
only work to fulfill the first. However, the opportunity for voters to
weigh one another's opinions is inherently informal. It occurs between individuals in unpredictable settings and ways. Individual voters bear what minimal costs it requires. The only cost that can said to
be borne is that of whoever voluntarily facilitates or encourages it.
The candidate-or more accurately the candidate's donors-bear the
cost of the first. So we see that private campaign finance enables the
candidate to fulfill critical democratic need. What must be kept in
mind, however, is that the candidate is not uniquely qualified to fill
this need and is often impelled to manipulate it.
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THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM

A.

Why Reform?

Despite the findings we have discussed, judicial elections, as
they are now, have worked for New York. Though people grumble
about the judiciary, they do not openly contest its authority, which is
enough to ensure its survival as an effective institution. Why then
should something be fixed that does not appear broken? The answer
is that the efficacy of New York's elected judiciary is bolstered primarily, if not solely, by the tradition of the bench and its system of
review and oversight. Elections have only an incidental effect on this
foundation of judicial authority, such that one is free to adjust the judicial electoral process without fear of destabilizing the bench. This
freedom presents us with an opportunity to make otherwise frivolous
improvements in order to create surplus legislative, judicial, and democratic legitimacy.
Regardless, recent legal and technological developments, as
well as a fresh, post-White approach to financing and speech restrictions, might make the collection of surplus legitimacy possible.
B.

Consideration of Reform

Before continuing, we should review our aspirations, the nature of judicial elections, and our constitutional limitations. If judicial elections in New York are to be reconstructed, it must be done in
an attempt to secure good judges while promoting the democratic
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ideal. 22 ' The twin pillars of judicial election law are conduct and finance regulations. In addressing finance regulation, contributions of
more than $400 dollars222 must be allowed and we cannot limit the
amount of money personally spent by candidates or supporters,223 except where such expenditures amount to the most express sort of advocacy, and only during the shortest possible period leading up to the
election.224 In adjusting the judicial election conduct laws, speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored to New York's interest in preventing party bias. 2 5 At the same time, an indeterminate but limited
amount of breathing room is provided us in White with which one can
pursue interests unrecognized by the Supreme Court's campaign conduct and finance jurisprudence.226 Further, it must be acknowledged
that reform does not allow for the kind of compartmentalization this
analysis has managed to apply towards their ends. Their application
will necessarily be uneven and will often overlap.
Corruption is difficult to understand and even more difficult
to isolate and address.22 7 This makes tailoring reform to the anticorruption interest inherently problematic. However, the entrenchment of democratic government has a decidedly inverse impact on

22! See supra Part V.
222 See Randall, 548 U.S. at 261.
223 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46.
224 Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2667.
225 White, 536 U.S. at 776.

226 Id. at 783 (stating "we neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment requires
campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office").
227 Daniel Treisman, The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study, 76 J. PUB.
at
399,
431
(2000),
available

ECON.

http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/causes.PDF.
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corruption. 228

Thus, it is convenient that any reform narrowly tai-

lored toward promotion of democracy must be narrowly tailored to
the anti-corruption interest. As such, reform will be most efficient if
characterized as one that fights corruption via the promotion of democracy, but also designed to maximize beneficial "secondary" impacts on the interest in a good judiciary.
Before continuing, it should be understood that even the best
ideas are slow to gain traction in Albany. 229 Reformers acknowledge
that the primary agent of legislative change is not innovation or compassion, but crisis and the avoidance of crisis. However, we should
also be confident in the power of ideas to guide change when crisis
deems it appropriate. Building and asserting the ideas outlined below
also buries them in the soil of crisis for discovery at some undetermined time by panicked lawmakers. This is when the practical fruits
of our labor can be harvested. In the meantime, one can only hope
these ideas galvanize voters to precipitate crises by demanding
change.
1.

Website

The New York State Board of Elections ought to establish an
open forum website devoted to particular judicial campaigns.

It

would provide designated pages and forums for each candidate, as
well as a central forum for open discussion and the posting of donations and expenditures. Each candidate's committee would be pro-

228 Id. at 432-33.

229 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 2003) (encompassing the last fault

divorce statute in the United States).
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vided complete access to its own page and a central, neutral administrator would administer the open forum, screening only for inappropriate, non-campaign related content, or content posted by plants
from another campaign. 230 This page would provide a central location for lay voters to interact with both judicial election campaigns,
and purview the candidates' records and judicial philosophy.

It

would also publish the candidates' campaign receipt and expenditure
reports.
The possibilities that the Internet presents the democratic debate are so compelling that if New York were to adopt this approach
it is unlikely it would be the only state to do so. 2 31 By opening spontaneous and instant lines of communication between people, both
globally and locally with equal intensity, the Internet has made possible a public discourse unimaginable even thirty years ago.232 One
need look no further then Wikipedia or Craigslist to glimpse the
Internet's potential to not only alter the democratic debate, but the
collective perception of reality and human interaction.

3

For our

230 A campaign plant is the agent of a candidate who poses as a neutral voter or supporter
of the opponent candidate in order to leverage support for the principle candidate. The tactic
has become increasingly popular. See Ed Pilkington, Planted Question Damages Clinton in
State,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Nov.
12,
2007,
Key
Primary
Dan Froomhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/nov/12/uselections2008.intemational;
kin, Scandal in the Press Corps, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2005.
231 See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 856-71 (2003) (describing the potential effect of weblogs, collaborative draft sights, filtering software, and government websites coupled with
the increasing availability of Internet access on public discourse).
232 Id. at 778.
233 See Neal Katyal, Property Rights on the Frontier: The Economics of Self-Help and
Self-Defense in Cyberspace, I J. L. ECON. & POL'Y 33, 49 (2005) ("The community in cyberspace may revolve around any number of things, such as a virtual place (eBay); a place in
realspace (Georgetown); a concept (Maoism); or even a sport (windsurfing). The proliferation of such communities, and the ease of transacting in each one, suggest robust potential
for community solutions."); Ken S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fittingthe Communications De-
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purposes, the Internet allows a democracy to overcome the physical
and temporal limitations that have always hindered the engagement
of a policy wide debate. Though the website proposed here would be
the smallest step toward harnessing this potential, the harnessing itself is inevitable and taking this step is only logical.
This logic is sound without considering the reality that Internet anonymity and international transmission renders the enforceability of content-based speech restrictions either impossible or prohibitively expensive. 34

Let us suppose a candidate would announce

herself as one of "law and order,,

235

while an "unaffiliated" person

sent an anonymous email from abroad to local law enforcement officials announcing further the candidate would "work with" and "assist" them,236 or promise the conviction of notorious defendant?
Combined, these communications would clearly violate Part 100, but
without proof of the speaker's identity, much less the candidate's direction, no real sanction could be imposed. 23 7 However, whether the
resources of the New York Board of Elections are enough, or efficiently devoted to enforcement of Part 100 in such an instance is a
moot point in light of much more easily accessed loopholes already

cency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 163, 164-65 (2006) (describing, briefly, the

dispute over truth which revolves around Wikipedia).

234 Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymity and InternationalLaw Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231, 240-41 (1996) (noting law enforcement,

through the legislature, has reacted to this enforcement dilemma by attempting to make
Internet crimes easier to commit, and hence easier to enforce); see Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 535
U.S. 564, 570 (2002) (ruling as overbroad, an attempt to expand the definition of child pornography in response to a proliferation of child pornography on the Internet).
235See Shanley, 774 N.E.2d at 736.
236 See Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 4.
237Edelstein, supra note 234, at 237-38.
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built into it.23 8 A publicly funded and moderated website, coupled
with relaxed speech restrictions to be discussed below, would head
off this potential danger to electoral integrity. By consolidating the
judicial electoral debate in a way that enables the publication of unaffiliated and/or anonymous statements, it would dilute the overall impact of any statement.
The website could also provide candidates a forum in which
to point out inconsistencies in each other's records. This would favor
candidates who are better able to justify their judicial record, legal career, and judicial philosophy, and therefore encourage the selection of
candidates capable of consistent legal interpretation. Also, the website would allow voters to weigh their impressions of the candidate
and share stories about her. This would benefit candidates of higher
esteem, and so ensure the selection of judges who are best able to
maintain the dignity of the bench.
The Unified Court System does post a voter's guide through
its website

9

It includes brief biographies of the candidates and their

personal statements or pictures as they provide them.2 40 This website
only covers judicial elections within the Unified Court System and
therefore excludes, among others, campaigns for county court.

It

does not engage in the sort of debate you would expect in any other
democratic election. The crucial difference between the traditional
238 See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
239 New York State Unified Court Sys., Publications, Judicial Elections,

Voter Guide,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/vote/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). This site includes guides
going back to the 2005 election.
240 New York State Unified Court Sys., Appellate Division, First Department,
Qualified
Candidates
for
Judicial
Offices
2008
Elections,
http://courts.state.ny.us/courts/adl/candidates2008.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
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voter's guide approach to election websites and the open forum approach advocated here does not need highlighting. Also, the judicial
candidate committees typically offer their own websites. 24 1 These

bear a predictable lack of substance. Though they tend to provide an
overview of the judicial candidate's education and career, without the
oversight of a neutral third party or the freedom to delineate how a
judicial candidate would exercise the authority, these resumes are of
limited value.
Finally, the website proposed here would not create any constitutional problems. It does not place any restrictions on speech and
the information it would publish is both entrenched in the core of protected First Amendment speech and is currently available to voters, if
only through prohibitively extensive research. Even assuming it were
subject to strict scrutiny, it serves the anti-corruption interest by enabling voters to examine a candidate's record, donation receipts, and
expenditure reports.

The freedom of judicial speech the website

would encourage and require would run afoul of New York's current
speech restrictions, which is one of the reasons these restrictions must
be relaxed.
2.

Relax Speech Restrictions

A judicial candidate's appointed committee ought to be able
to inform the public as to how a candidate, if she has been a judge before, has ruled in the past or how she would have ruled in the past had

241

See, e.g., Comm. to Elect Former Judge Linda Stephens, http://www.judgelinda.org/

(last visited Feb. 19, 2009); Elect Patrick Lepore for Judge, http://www.patricklepore.com
(last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
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she been a judge.242 This would involve the presentation of court
opinions, academic articles, public statements, and the like. It would
not, however, go so far as to allow ruminations (much less promises)
on how a candidate would rule on future cases.
The ruling in White limited the possibilities of regulation, but
imposed no such limits on deregulation.243

Indeed, by taking the

moment to specifically allocate judicial campaign speech the full
weight of First Amendment protection,244 it might be said the Court
was encouraging it. Still, allowing deregulation to go to the point
where candidates are allowed to make party-specific campaign promises would undermine veneration of the bench, stymie a judge's own
consistency in legal interpretation and would likely undermine a defendant's right to a fair trial.245 The same can be said of allowing the
candidate herself to make these sorts of promises. Therefore, deregulation cannot be allowed to go so far as to permit a candidate herself
to explain her judicial philosophy. Only the committee should be
permitted to actively campaign on the candidate's behalf, and the current limits should be broadened to allow statements about how a
judge has or would have ruled on particular legal issues in the past.
242 Though one might be tempted to retain a prohibition against speculation, the rational
relationship between it and its ends are tenuous. It is also tempting to include an explicit
prohibition against "personal attacks," meaning attacks on the judicial candidate's character
by other judicial candidates. Engaging in these sorts of attacks would clearly be detrimental
to the judiciary and judicial elections (as is the case with the other branches of government).
However, an explicit prohibition would be inappropriate for three reasons: (1) it is unlikely
to pass constitutional muster as narrowly tailored to the anti-corruption interest; (2) the prohibition is seemingly implicit in the culture ofjudicial elections; and (3) if a candidate is incapable of surviving a personal attack, she is not likely capable of upholding the veneration
of the bench.
243 White, 536 U.S. at 774-75.
244

Id. at 788.

245 Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 6.
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This kind of deregulation would also amount to an abandonment of the logical irrelevance of New York's current judicial speech
restrictions. This in and of itself is valuable. Part 100 is susceptible
to the same criticism as Minnesota's Announce Clause in that judges
are allowed to announce their views before and after an election, but
not during.24 6 The deregulation proposed here does not make this information any more available than it already is; it simply allows judicial candidates' committees to gather and consolidate it on behalf of
the voters.
Relaxed speech restrictions, coupled with the open-forum
website, allow judicial campaign committees to more efficiently bear
their burden of public education by broadening the scope of communicable information and promoting real and material engagement of
and between the polity. This achieves not only the promotion of democracy through education, but the subjection of a judicial candidate's record to scrutiny. By allowing the consolidation of records, a
relaxation of speech restrictions would offer voters a realistic opportunity to discover inconsistencies in a judge's record and would offer
the candidate's committee an opportunity to explain their candidate's
judicial philosophy. Furthermore, candidates incapable of justifying
their record's logic would be discouraged from running altogether.
As such, the relaxation of Part 100 would advance all of New York's
interests in judicial elections.

246

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.5 (2009); White, 536 U.S. at 779-80.
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Lower Campaign Contribution Limits

There is no reason to believe that campaign donations are particularly determinative of the outcomes of judicial elections. The
correlation between donations and victory can go both ways: candidates with more money can better influence voters and will likely win
an election and donors, wishing to garner favor with a powerful person, are more likely to back a likely winner. 4 7 It is not argued here
that they are determinative of judicial outcomes. It is clear, however,
that voters are convinced that donations beget judicial impropriety.248
Since veneration of the bench is one of the ends and since veneration
is in the eyes of the beholder, this is all that matters. Though this information is available, if the public became generally aware of the
fact that local attorneys and business owners routinely donated tens
of thousands of dollars to the campaigns of a judge before whom they
routinely appeared,249 the damage to that judge's legitimacy would be
irreparable.
Consider further that only a small percentage of total donations are actually spent.25 0 As a purely practical matter, judicial campaigns do not need the money they get, which makes the risk such
money poses to judicial legitimacy utterly reckless when compared

247 LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 214, at 10-12.
248 COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note

19, app.

G, at 5 (illustrating the limitations of candidates' ability to collect contributions); NAT'L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY
5 (1999) (indicating that nearly eighty percent of voters believe contributions influence a
judge's ruling in some way).
249 See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
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with what little value it is to both the candidates and the electorate. 25
Since the $50,000 limit afforded donors allows us at least $49,000
worth of constitutional leeway,252 we should take advantage of the
fact that significant reductions can do little harm to the financing of
judicial elections while securing the bench against potential scandal.
4.

Unified CampaignFund

Between fifty and sixty percent of judicial campaign donations ought to be diverted to an open judicial campaign fund that
would be used to maintain the website, advertise its existence, fund
the Judicial Qualifications Committee, and furnish funds for other
house-keeping campaign activities incurred by the State. The donations would be made in the name of one candidate or another and be
posted on the website. The remaining fifty and forty percent would
go to the candidate named.
This remaining percentage would be enough for a candidate
to conduct her campaign, even if donations were dramatically lessened by the aforementioned contribution limits. The Teresi campaign
spent just forty-one percent of its total contributions,253 with only
twenty-eight percent going to essential educational purposes.2 54
251

See Gadani v. Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y., 841 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (App. Div.

3d Dep't 2007) (granting summary judgment to a donor who, through it's president and
PAC, had contributed $7,500 to the judge's recent re-election campaign).
252 Randall,548 U.S. at 260-62.
253 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 56 and 67 and accompanying text. Two considerations must bear on
this understanding of these numbers. The first is that this spending was conducted in a noncompetitive election. If judicial elections are to become more democratic, they should also
be made more competitive and therefore expensive. However, the second consideration
demonstrates that since the elections from which these numbers are drawn were uncompetitive and because so much money was being donated, a need for efficient spending was not
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Though spending habits would necessarily require curtailment, judicial campaigns could bear both the limits and the fund, especially
considering the website would go a long way towards absolving a
campaign of its job as educator.
The united campaign fund would encourage veneration of the
bench by reinforcing the uniqueness of the judicial branch already
manifest in its procedures and culture.

5

By requiring both candi-

dates to contribute to a fund spent neutrally and for the sole purpose
of anointing the best candidate, the message that New York's judges
are above politics is necessarily reinforced. It would preserve the
current culture of judicial elections and work against the sort of "debate" to which other political contests have long since succumbed by
absolving judicial candidate committees of a large portion of their
power to allocate funds. Further, it would promote more effective
voter education, at least compared to the current system of private,
adversarial campaign spending. By anointing a disinterested spender
immune from temptations to "go negative," the campaign fund will
isolate and protect a source of voter education spending from devolving into a series of salvos that are irrelevant to the purposes of judicial selection.
The unified campaign fund would be susceptible to First
Amendment challenge, particularly a challenge claiming that it forces
donors to lend support to judicial candidates of which they do not ap-

imposed. As such, the numbers with which this analysis is working are both less and more
than one might require after this reform is imposed.
255 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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prove.256 This argument has been made most often by union workers
objecting on First Amendment grounds to the activities of unions
within the political arena.257 No one can predict with certainty how
the Supreme Court would receive this argument from New York's
judicial campaign contributors, but important distinctions can be
drawn based on both the facts and the law. The primary purpose of a
campaign donation is to finance a campaign, while union dues pay
for the privilege of the union's advocacy with the employer.2 58 The
unified fund's expenditure of the donor's contribution would be more
than fifty percent in line with the donor's intent. Moreover, the contribution to the fund would be in the donor's candidate's name, and
insofar as the donation is a statement of support, its speech-value to
the donor remains intact.

Voters would know what wealthy or

prominent citizens donated to a judicial campaign and the unified
fund; so the message of the donation would not be silenced, and with
the website, would be more effectively communicated.2 "9 The Constitution also supports this unified fund. First, the constitutionality of
campaign donation regulations is well established.26 °

Second, the

unique and compelling interests presented by judicial campaigns justify regulation that would be unconstitutional in other settings. 26' For
both reasons, the differences in fact and law suggest the unified cam-

256 See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 769-70 (1961)

(holding that

workers who object to their union's non-bargaining political activities may require their dues
be excluded from such spending).
257Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1991).
258 Id.

259 Randall, 548 U.S. at 241-42; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.
260
261

See supra notes 72-124 and accompanying text.
White, 536 U.S. at 783.
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paign fund would be keeping in with the First Amendment.262
5.

Rewrite the Mission of the Independent
JudicialElection QualificationCommission

On a fundamental level, the Independent Judicial Election
Qualification Commission embodies a fundamental lack of faith in
voters to select good judges. This official distrust can only serve to
discourage voter participation, both in education and voting. In establishing an organization whose sole purpose is to lend a statesanctioned endorsement to certain candidates, New York's Unified
Court System has arrogated a decision, which a democracy demands
remain in the hands of voters alone. An election, after all, is premised on the understanding that no one but the electorate ought to decide whether a candidate is qualified enough to lead it. As it stands,
the Independent Judicial Election Qualification Commission is a
meager attempt to circumvent the judicial election process while an
263
appointive system is installed to replace it.
If the Qualification Commission has a place in judicial elections at all, it is as a disinterested educator, not as an endorser or
screener of candidates. The committee's resources should be devoted
to the accumulation of materials illuminating a candidate's professional and scholarly history that would then be made available to voters.
In this role as a publicly funded research organization vetting
262

Of course, any risk of unconstitutionality could be avoided by making the fund "volun-

tary" on the part of the campaign. Since judicial campaigns have so much more money than
needed, and because not donating to a voluntary unified fund might reflect poorly on the
candidate, it is not likely this would greatly hamper the fund's resources.
263 See supra note 19.
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judicial candidates side-by-side with other candidates, the Judicial
Qualifications Committee would be an effective stabilizer where judicial elections prove very contentious. It would prove or disprove
claims, both made by the judicial candidate's committee about the
opposing judicial candidate, and also the assertions made by the candidate's committee regarding the candidate's policy or history. 264
As with the website, the activities of the Qualification Commission would constitute a service to the voters of New York with no
restriction on the activities of a judicial candidate's freedom.

As

such, there could be no cognizable First Amendment claim. Even
under the current judicial speech regime 265 no claim could be drawn,
since the current rules only restrict the speech of the candidate and to
a lesser extent her committee, and not the speech of third parties.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has sought to shed light on the practical and
legal exigencies of New York's curious and oft-overlooked judicial
elections and in so doing ruminate upon possibilities in improving
them. New York's judicial elections, if imperfect, are hardly on the
verge of disaster with respect to their purpose. Where they fail, and
dismally so, are as exercises in democratic government. The facts of
L6pez Torres, and Justice Kennedy's stinging rebuke of New York's
status quo, have made it abundantly clear that New York's judicial
elections are in need of real reform.
264

See, e.g., FactCheck.org, Annenberg Political Fact Check, http://factcheck.org (last

visited Mar. 28, 2009). This is one of many websites which attempts to determine whether
statements made are truthful, fabrications, or flat out falsities.
265 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.5 (2009).
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It seems paradoxical to some, especially lawmakers and the
organizations of the profession, that trial judges, whose impartiality
and reason are the cornerstone of their authority, are selected by such
a theoretically adversarial and impassioned means as an election. For
these thinkers, the paradox lies only in their own lowered expectations of New York's voters. The current laws regulating the scope of
the judicial electoral debate are a product of these expectations, and
manifest a fundamental distrust of the New York electorate's ability
to make reasoned decisions about the bench.
The reforms agreed upon here amount to a casting off of this
distrust and a fresh effort to take the electorate seriously and to provide it with the opportunity and means to participate in this, the highest and most critical echelon of law making. They are born of an understanding that democracy cannot breathe if it is not embraced and
that a polity cannot be free if not trusted by its government.
With this in mind, the subject of our analysis should not serve
to limit our thinking on these reforms to just judicial elections. The
compelling state interest in preventing party bias, unique to judicial
elections,

66 allows

campaign regulations and practices that might be

unconstitutional in legislative or electoral elections. Judicial culture,
in its self-regulation and tradition, and its structure, with substantial
and sophisticated oversight by attorneys and appellate courts, afford
us considerable protection against democratic failure. Both amount
to an unmatched opportunity to innovate, and the lessons learned here
may very well aid us in remedying the anti-democratic tendencies of
266

White, 536 U.S. at 776.
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legislative and executive elections.
As Justice Kennedy stressed, this is an opportunity that must
be taken. A weighing of the potential benefits against the potential
costs and harms urges us to seize this moment to transform New
York's judicial elections into institutions of democratic exercise and
267
innovation and to rescue them from the smoky-parlor politics

which continue to invoke so much ridicule, shame, and ultimately
tyranny.

267 L6pez Torres, 462 F.3d at169.
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FIRST AMENDMENT
United States Constitution Amendment I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Governmentfor a redress of grievances.
New York Constitution article I, section 8:
Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right, and no law shall be passed to restrainor abridge the liberty of
speech or of the press.
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